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This paper examines the impact of the volatility of foreign portfolio investment on the financial 
constraints of small firms.  Utilizing a dataset of over 195,000 firm-year observations across 53 
countries, I examine the impact of foreign portfolio investment instability on capital issuance and 
firm growth across countries and firm characteristics, in particular size.  After controlling for the 
endogeneity of foreign portfolio investment instability, as well as for firm-, industry- and 
country-level characteristics such as GDP growth as well as the levels of foreign portfolio and 
direct investment, I find that the volatility of foreign portfolio investment is only significantly 
associated with a decreased ability to issue publicly-traded securities for small firms in years 
when nations are considered less ‘creditworthy.’  Importantly, the volatility of foreign portfolio 
investment also only hinders the growth of small firms significantly in periods when nations are 
deemed less ‘creditworthy.’  These results underscore both the significance of a good financial 
system that minimizes capital flow volatility as well as the influence of property rights and 
country creditworthiness to instill confidence in foreign investors. 
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“The causes of the currency crises in emerging markets during the late 1990s have been 
the subject of much debate—especially considering that, before the crises, many of the 
Asian countries tended to have balanced budgets and generally sound macroeconomic 
performance. …Some observers argue that given the generally favorable macroeconomic 
conditions, that the crises were not caused by incompatibility between fiscal and 
monetary policies and exchange rate pegs, but rather by the unexpected and self-fulfilling 
panics of foreign investors.” 
 
Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco:  Economic Letter 
 
The volatility of foreign portfolio investment, and not the global capital flow itself, is 
thought by the majority of economists to be the limiting aspect of short-term foreign investment, 
and has motivated leaders such as former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed to 
shut down country borders to foreign investment.  Extant literature contends that the volatility of 
capital flows can be damaging to an economy, or at least will diminish the benefits derived from 
the foreign investment capital.  But does the volatility of capital flows destroy all of the benefits 
derived from the capital flow itself, in particular the enhanced access to finance it provides for 
small firms?   And for small firms, those particularly sensitive to macroeconomic variation, is 
volatility always damaging? 
In this essay, I examine how the instability of foreign portfolio investment impacts the 
financial constraints, and ultimately the growth, of small firms.  I do not find evidence that the 
volatility of foreign portfolio investment (also referred to as FPI) - examined without 
distinguishing terms of relative confidence (or country “creditworthiness”) in a country, as 
measured by an institutional investors rating, is damaging to small firm access to finance, as 
measured by the probability of public capital issuance.  Once examined in subsets of “investment 
grade” and “noninvestment grade” country-years, subsets which are a proxies for the level of 
confidence institutional investors have in a country’s distance from crisis, and controlling for the 
level of foreign investment, I find that small firm access to finance is only significantly      2 
   
 
negatively associated with the volatility of FPI when nations are deemed less ‘creditworthy,’ or 
closer to crisis.  Importantly, I also find that the volatility of foreign portfolio investment only 
hinders the growth of small firms in the same less ‘creditworthy’ subset.  These results imply 
that the benefits derived from FPI are not depleted in times when country risk is deemed low.    
These benefits, such as increased liquidity and an enhanced investment environment (Levine and 
Zervos 1996) through better corporate governance, investor protection and transparency 
(Feldman and Kumar (1995)), have been linked to an increased level of access to finance (La 
Porta et al. (2000)) and to more efficient allocation of capital (Wurgler 2000; Love 2003; Rajan 
and Zingales 1998). 
The paper most related to mine is Laeven (2003)
2.  His paper examines the impact of 
reform policies (e.g. liberalization) on financial constraints rather than any resulting changes in 
specific capital flows.  Laeven (2003) differs from this paper on many dimensions.  It focuses on 
the result of financial constraints (i.e. investment sensitivity to cash) whereas I look to the source 
of the financial constraints, capital markets and bank credit.  Utilizing the Euler equation, his 
paper examines implied external financial constraints.  This paper, instead, uses evidence of 
external financing (i.e. issuing equity and debt), which Fazzari et al. (1988) believe is relevant 
when examining financial constraints.  Importantly, Laeven (2003) differs from this paper with 
regard to data.  Laeven (2003) utilizes the Worldscope database, which some believe suffers 
from a large-firm bias.  Inasmuch as my emphasis is on small firms, I create a unique database of 
over 195,000 observations and across 53 countries to circumvent this bias.  Given the 
considerable differences across focus, methodology and scope, it is difficult to compare results, 
however, this paper suggests a sustained positive association of foreign portfolio investment 
                                                 
2 Samak and Helmy (2000) provide a very thorough analysis of foreign portfolio investment in Egypt but is not a 
true empirical work so is not considered a related paper.      3 
   
 
levels in the presence of volatility, which supports as well as extends the contentions set forth by 
Laeven (2003) nicely. 
This paper contributes to three main areas of literature.  The first is small firm access to 
capital.  As markets become more integrated, foreign portfolio investment is a potential source of 
new investment capital for these financially constrained firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic – henceforth BDM - 2005).  Information as to whether this additional source of 
capital for small firms is feasible given the information and agency environments is useful in 
extending this literature. 
This work is also related to the literature on global capital flows.  As more and more 
countries consider reforming foreign investment policy to enable capital market integration, this 
area of research becomes a resource for many.   
Lastly, this research touches on that of liberalization.  Although, not a study on 
liberalization, this paper offers insight into the impact of one potential factor in a country’s 
investment environment, foreign portfolio investment.  Capital market liberalization opens 
country borders to foreign investment, which may ultimately broaden and deepen financial 
markets but can also open countries to vulnerability to the fickleness of foreign investment.  
Understanding what drives the aftermath of liberalization, such as the impact of a change in 
foreign portfolio investment, may offer insight into the debate on liberalization. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section I examines previous literature in 
area important to this analysis and provides motivation for the analysis, section II details the 
methodology used.  Section III describes in detail the extensive data sample that I utilize in my 
examination.  Section IV gives results, section V provides a robustness check and Section VI 
concludes the paper.      4 
   
 
I. Motivation   
A.  The Benefits of Market Integration 
 
Research done at the macro level shows that liberalization of investment regulations 
reduces the cost of capital in a country through capital market integration, increases capital flows 
such as foreign portfolio investment into the host country (Bekaert and Harvey 2003), increases 
stock returns during the process (Patro and Wald 2005) increases the liquidity and size of 
markets (Levine and Zervos 1996), and leads to an increase in the real economic growth over a 
medium-term (Bekaert et al 2003).  Focusing on the stock market impacts mentioned, the supply-
side of capital increases, and the increased depth of financial markets caused by the level of 
foreign portfolio investment flowing into a financial market potentially eases the financial 
constraint of firms (Laeven 2003; Knill 2004)
3, improves the allocation of capital (Wurgler 
2000) and is often accompanied by improvements in transparency of accounting reporting and 
corporate governance (Feldman and Kumar 1995).   
Importantly, the desire of countries, and the companies within them
4, to “pull”
5 foreign 
portfolio investment to their economies motivates improvements in such things as corporate 
governance (Shinn 2000) and investor protection/property rights (Bekaert and Harvey 2003).  
This in turn leads to increased investment (Dahlquist et al 2002; Claessens and Laeven 2003)
6 
and a cycle of investment environment improvement ensues.  This cycle is longer-term in nature 
and is not likely to stop suddenly based on changes in the level of foreign investment. 
                                                 
3 See also Chari and Henry (2004) who find that the growth rate of a firm’s capital stock exceeds that of its pre-
liberalization rate. 
4 A McKinsey & Company Global Investor Opinion Survey (2002) finds that investors are prepared to pay a 
premium for companies exhibiting enhanced corporate governance standards.  This premium is on average 12-14% 
in North America, and Western Europe, 20-25% in Asia and Latin American and over 30% in Eastern Europe and 
Africa. 
5 See, for example, Calvo et al. (1993); Claessens (1995); Claessens et al. (1995) 
6 The opposite effect is also true – see Aggarwall et al. (2003) for characteristics investors look for in foreign 
investment countries.         5 
   
 
B.  The Costs of Market Integration 
The impacts of the influx of capital flows and capital market integration that occur in 
such events as liberalization, however, are not necessarily all good.  Bekaert and Harvey point 
out in their liberalization literature survey that liberalization, and the resulting increase in 
investment capital, may also have negative impacts.  These negative impacts are vastly due to the 
short-term nature of this capital flow - its volatility – or equivalently, its potential to cause 
investor unease or panic.  This panic can either be a result of, or caused by, crisis within a 
country.  In contrast to the level of the capital flow, its variance sometimes referred to as its 
instability, causes pressures on the money supply, exchange rates and stock market volatility
7 
8 
of its host nations, making keeping tight reigns on economic policy difficult for governments.  At 
times, it can even increase a country’s propensity for crisis, or exacerbate the impact of an 
existing crisis.  Henry (2003) points out that crises such as those in Asia, Russia and Latin 
America have challenged the merit of capital-account liberalization.  Henry (2000) questions the 
permanency of the increase in capital found to be associated with liberalization, suggesting that 
the increase in liquidity may only be temporary.  Henry and Lorentzen (2003) differentiate 
between liberalization with regard to equity and debt, stating the latter can be dangerous since it 
leads to a reliance on debt in the capital structure.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) find 
that banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized economies.  This is relevant to small 
firm access to finance not only due to the frequency of twin crises – the coincidental occurrence 
of banking and currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) - but also because crises in the 
banking sector could devastate small firms due to their reliance on this form of financing. 
                                                 
7 See also Patro and Wald (2005). 
8 Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) however contends that this actually that the data do not support this.      6 
   
 
Given that small firms are so very sensitive to macroeconomic conditions (Beck et al 
2002; Tewari and Goebel 2002), increased volatility could diminish any benefit achieved 
through the increased supply of investment capital (Knill, 2004).  Indeed, Samak and Helmy 
(2000) find in their examination of foreign portfolio equity investment in Egypt that maximizing 
the ultimate value of this form of foreign investment is dependent upon macroeconomic stability 
and a strong existing market infrastructure.  To complicate matters further, the areas that seem to 
have the most to gain from global investment capital flows such as foreign portfolio investment 
seem to enjoy these capital flows only accompanied by potentially damaging capital flow 
volatility (see figures 1 and 2).   
C.  Weighing the Impact and Volatility of Capital Flows 
Whether the potentially damaging aspect of FPI, volatility, overpowers the benefits 
derived from the actual capital flow itself (e.g. increased liquidity, improved allocation of 
capital, improved corporate governance/investor protection/transparency), depends upon the 
impact of FPI volatility on these benefits.  Investment environment improvements such as 
corporate governance, investor protection and/or transparency are put into effect because of 
capital inflow volatility and are supported by the company trying to obtain financing, 
government officials trying to attract foreign investment, foreign investors with a potential stake 
in their investment
9 and official aid organizations such as the World Bank with the intent to 
decrease the volatility of capital flows.  Examples of government legislation requiring these 
improvements in disclosure/transparency as well as improved corporate governance in less 
developed nations are increasing
10.   These laws seeking to improve corporate governance and 
                                                 
9 See Khanna and Palepu (1999). 
10 Korea has implemented a law requiring domestic companies to produce quarterly results.   China is switching 
from “cash” to “accrual” accounting.  Brazil has just legally limited the number of non-voting shares a company can      7 
   
 
indirectly investor protection also seek to stabilize capital inflows, making them less likely to be 
positively correlated with FPI volatility or crisis.   Improvements of corporate governance at the 
firm level, induced by competitive forces for capital – both domestic and foreign - are not likely 
to be dropped by firms simply because their domicile nation is in crisis or that FPI becomes more 
volatile perhaps even leaving the country for a year or two.  In fact, this might induce firms to 
improve corporate governance measures such as board of director composition or disclosure 
even further, or at least to maintain the improvements already made to attract future foreign 
capital and to maintain or establish better access to capital domestically.  The benefits of FPI 
may actually serve to ultimately decrease a country’s dependence on foreign investment by 
improving the investment environment enough to stabilize domestic investment which will 
eventually decrease the damaging impacts of the volatility of these capital flows.  Assuming this 
is true, any potentially damaging effects of FPI could be attributed to “short run pain for long run 
gain” (Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), implying that any damages associated with FPI 
volatility are only short-term  and importantly that FPI is ultimately beneficial. 
Although liquidity is more short-term in nature and would likely be impacted by 
volatility in the level of foreign portfolio investment, the positive impact of FPI would only be 
nullified if market liquidity reverses in the presence of FPI volatility.  This does not seem to be 
the case.  The liquidity of markets does not systematically decrease with FPI volatility, as is seen 
in figure 3.  In fact, the correlation between the two when using total value of listed securities 
traded as liquidity is a significant positive 0.5051
11.   This correlation, as well as studies that 
foreign investors do not destabilize markets any more than local investors (Dvorak 2001; Levine 
and Schmukler 2003), challenge the notion that market liquidity drops in volatile times (e.g. the 
                                                                                                                                                             
issue.  Mexico has created a law which precludes holding companies from gaining a controlling share of a company 
to force minority shareholders to sell at below market value.   
11 Using percent of market traded instead of total value traded yields a significant correlation of 0.3902.      8 
   
 
flight of foreign capital)
12.   If the majority of the benefits of FPI with regard to small firm access 
to capital (see Knill 2004) flow through the enhanced market liquidity, and volatility is 
significantly positively correlated with market liquidity in “good” times, as defined as periods 
when confidence in a country’s tranquility is increased, it could be posited that FPI volatility 
does not destroy the enhanced access to capital small firms achieve coincidental to FPI flows.  
Given the lack of compelling evidence that FPI volatility damages or neutralizes the 
positive benefits of FPI along with the anecdotal evidence that liquidity may not be decreasing 
with FPI volatility in all times, I contend that the volatility of FPI, as measured by the logarithm 
of the variance of the FPI net flows scaled by a proxy for the size of an economy, gross domestic 
product (GDP), for the period t-1 through t-3, does not significantly decrease the access to 
finance of small firms in all times.  In periods when foreign institutional investors have more 
confidence that the country is relatively immune to imminent crisis (i.e. lower country risk), 
waves of foreign portfolio investment should not hinder small firm access to finance.  Tested 
empirically this becomes: 
H1) Controlling for the level of foreign portfolio investment, the volatility in  
foreign portfolio investment (scaled by the size of the host county) does not  
significantly impede small firm access to capital, as measured by the probability  
of capital issuance, in times of increased country confidence, as measured by an  
increase in the institutional investor rating.    
It is worth noting here the importance of the inclusion of the FPI level so that the impact 
of the volatility of the flow can be disentangled from the level itself.  Including this variable 
should enable the true effect of the instability of this capital flow to be uncovered.  Also relevant 
is the fact that volatility is scaled by gross domestic product.  This is to address the fact that large 
developed countries such as the United States actually have a larger FPI volatility than smaller 
                                                 
12 See also Borensztein and Gelos (2001) and Karolyi (1999), who find that the herding of investors, which is often 
cited as the cause of the volatility of this capital flow, is not significantly different in crisis versus noncrisis periods.         9 
   
 
countries such as Peru, yet they are able to absorb such things often without negative 
implications.   
Bekaert and Harvey (2003), Henry (2000) and Henry and Lorentzen (2003), papers 
described earlier in the motivation, point out the potentially negative attributes of capital flows 
such as increased pressure on money supply, exchange rates and market volatility, and mainly 
base these contentions on the volatility inherent in this short-term capital flow.  Given the 
potentially fickle nature of this capital flow coupled with the sensitivity of small firms to 
macroeconomic volatility (BDM 2005), would an increase in FPI volatility impact the growth of 
small firms?  Even if H1 can not be disproven, and volatility does not materially impede the 
ability of these firms to raise capital in periods of enhanced country creditworthiness/low 
propensity for crisis, could it ever be perceived as less than damaging to small firm growth?  
Given the sensitive nature of small firms to macroeconomic factors, as well as the overall 
negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on small firm access to capital, it is likely that 
volatility has a negative impact on the growth of these firms.   Having said that, if H1 can not be 
disproved, it would follow that one would not find significant evidence that FPI volatility hinders 
small firm growth in all times. 
H2)  Controlling for the level of foreign portfolio investment, the volatility of  
foreign portfolio investment (scaled by gross domestic product) does not significantly  
hinder the growth of small firms as measured by the log difference in both total  
assets and sales revenue. 
II.  Methodology 
A.  Volatility in Foreign Investment 
To test whether the volatility of foreign portfolio investment, as calculated as the 
logarithm of the variance of foreign portfolio investment over years t-1 through t-3, is damaging 
to small firm access to capital, I divide my sample of 44 countries into subsets based on the      10 
   
 
creditworthiness of the country-year – “investment grade” for those country-years more than the 
annual sample median Institutional Investor Rating and “noninvestment grade” for those 
country-years less than the annual sample median.  This is important given the fact that “shifts in 
international portfolio composition usually correspond to changes in perceptions of country 
solvency by international investors rather than to variations in underlying asset value (FitzGerald 
1999).  It is also important given the responsibility that investors are given for their role in crises.  
The quote at the beginning of this essay from the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco points 
to the popular perception that investor panic causes crises - not asset value – thus investor 
perception of risk is an important factor in the potential downside of FPI.  Inasmuch as sovereign 
risk is determined to be a leading indicator of crisis (Kaminsky et al. 1998), but not a significant 
predictor of FPI values (Agarwal 1997), concerns of interdependence between these categories 
and FPI volatility should be allayed.  Estimating the impact of sustained volatility on small firm 
access to finance, as measured by the probability of capital issuance (y=1 where firm i issues 
capital in time t and equals zero otherwise), I perform the following regression. 
Prob(y=1)j,t = β0 + FPIVolj,t-1β1 + FPIj,t-1 β2 + Xi,t-1β3 + Yj,t-1β4 + + Ii + t + ε   (1) 
 
where FPIVol is the predicted level of FPI volatility from the first-stage in the instrumental 
variable probit regression (see equation (2) for the first stage) and is calculated as the variance of 
foreign portfolio investment scaled by gross domestic product (GDP), FPI is the average level of 
foreign portfolio investment scaled by GDP in the period t-1 through t-3 (parallel to the volatility 
term), X is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables such as cash flow, debt/asset level, 
profitability, risk, external financing necessary, asset tangibility and crosslisting.  These variables 
control for occurrences wherein firms would be more likely to issue (see for example, Korajczyk, 
and Levy 2003; Baker and Wurgler 2002).  Y is a vector of lagged alternate sources of capital      11 
   
 
such as foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, domestic credit, savings and 
GDP growth.  FPI, as previously mentioned, is added to distinguish between investment 
level/trend
13.  Macroeconomic variables are averaged over the years t-1 through t-3 to in order to 
parallel the volatility term and to abstract from business cycles.  This methodology is often used 
in cross-country analyses to smooth out annual fluctuations that can otherwise confound results 
(see BDM 2003; Rousseau and Wachtel 2002
14).  I is a vector of industry dummies to control for 
industry effects and t represents time dummies, which control for any time effect in the panel.  A 
description of the firm-, industry- and country-specific variables is in the data section as well as 
in the appendices
15.  The instrumental probit methodology used implements frequency weights to 
avoid data cloning issues and utilizes a bootstrapping methodology, which uses randomly chosen 
subsamples
16 of the dataset with replacement to avoid dependence on assumption of the 
normality of distribution or the absence of stochastic influences on the data. 
According to Agarwal (1997), the significant determinants of foreign portfolio 
investment are inflation, the real exchange rate, market capitalization and some proxy for 
economic activity.  Inasmuch as the actual capital flows are suffering from potential endogeneity 
issues, volatility of these capital flows will likely suffer the same.  Supporting this contention is 
the statistically significant correlation between FPI volatility and other macroeconomic variables 
utilized in the analysis.  Since endogeneity of the volatility of foreign portfolio investment is a 
concern, I utilize an instrumental variable approach that in the first stage estimates FPI volatility 
and in a second stage estimates the regression in equation (1).  Robust standard errors are 
                                                 
13 Any concerns that interdependence between foreign portfolio investment flows and FPI volatility may drive 
results should be resolved by the fact that pairwise correlation of these two is once again below 10% and 
insignificant.   
14 See also Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2003). 
15 Tobin’s Q is not included in my analysis due to the scarcity and lack of consistency of information on market 
pricing in both less and more developed nations around the world.   
16 N=50 is used for bootstrap replication.      12 
   
 
adjusted to allow for within firm correlation of observations and a two-stage approach.  I regress 
foreign portfolio investment instability (I define volatility in absolute, relative log difference 
terms, as well as the change in volatility to ensure robustness) on relevant variables, such as 
corruption based on the relevance found in Knill (2004), relative interest rates and liquidity, 
based on work from Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and country sovereign risk as well as foreign 
exchange rate changes, based on work from Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Reinhart et al. (2003)
17.   
The empirical model is as follows: 
FPIVolj,t = γ0 + γ1ΔFXRatej,t + γ2Corrj,t + γ3RelIRj,t+ γ4ΔTVTj,t + γ5ΔIIRj,t + t + ε   (2) 
 
Performing the two-stage regression, I examine the impact of endogenously-determined 
FPI volatility on the probability of a firm issuing public capital.  Controlling for other influences 
in capital issuance, the relationship that exists between a finite change in volatility (increase or 
decrease) and the probability of capital issuance will offer support or help to reject the 
hypothesis, H1.  I expect this coefficient, β1, in equation (1) to be negative but insignificant for 
small firms in the investment grade sample.  Small firms in the noninvestment grade sample will 
likely exhibit a significantly negative association with capital issuance due to the negative 
relationship between liquidity and volatility in these times and in regressions that don’t delineate 
between increased or decreased country risk. 
B. Growth 
To examine whether the volatility of foreign portfolio investment ultimately hinders firm 
growth (H2), I utilize the growth rates of these firms by regressing the following: 
Growthit = δ0 + δ1FPIVolj,t-1 + δ2FPIj,t-1  + δ3Xi,t-1 + δ4Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + ε    ( 3 )  
                                                 
17 All instruments are significant at the 1% leel in this stage.      13 
   
 
where Growthi,t is firm i’s growth rate as calculated by the log difference in both total assets and 
(separately) sales revenue attained from year t through year t+1 scaled by the difference in time 
in period t+1 and time in period t.  The denominator in this calculation is included to ensure that 
annual growth rates are attained in cases where there exist missing years in the sample.  All other 
variables are as defined in equation (1).  If foreign portfolio investment volatility hinders small 
firm growth, then the coefficient of FPIVol, δ1, should be negative, reflecting in decrease in the 
growth rate with an increase in the volatility of foreign portfolio investment volatility. 
III. Data 
I obtain my data from the SDC Global New Issues database for the time period 1/1/1996 
through 3/31/2003
18.  Global new issues for all countries are not readily available proceeding this 
era in SDC.  Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), I exclude financial services due to the 
special circumstances of their asset base and utility firms (Macro Industry: Financial Services, 
Real Estate and Energy and Power) due to the abnormal stability and predictability of cash flow.  
I also exclude those firms that have gone bankrupt due to the special set of issues that are 
included in capital structure determination when a company is failing
19.  This follows the 
methodology of Asquith et al. (1994) who found that such situations generally cause a major 
restructuring of capital structure outside of the scope of financial constraint relaxation.  Lastly I 
exclude IPOs.  Welch (2004) finds that the firms who undertake IPOs find themselves in unique 
environment, which contains a different set of issues than the post-IPO period.  Including these 
firms would bias the results. 
I collect observations for common stock, non-convertible debt, convertible debt, non-
convertible preferred stock and convertible preferred stock issued domestically only.  The 
                                                 
18 Data before the beginning date of this period is sporadic 
19 Firms going bankrupt would have additional difficulty obtaining capital, which would confound results.       14 
   
 
exclusion of international issuances is intentional due to endogeneity between foreign portfolio 
investment with international issues.  Financials for the companies issuing domestically are 
hand-collected from REUTERS.  This approach enables me to have a much richer sample of 
global new issues around the world of firms than afforded me by SDC Platinum alone.  
REUTERS provides financial information on all publicly traded firms for the majority of 
countries in the world and as such does not suffer from the bias toward large firms to the extent 
that other international databases such as Worldscope/Datastream/Research Insight do.  In fact, 
REUTERS even covers pink sheets and OTC/Bulletin Board firms whereas the others do not.  As 
such, the coverage is much more comprehensive (see figure 4).  The only firms not covered in 
REUTERS are those that have gone bankrupt or have merged with another firm.  The first group 
has deliberately been excluded from the sample as previously mentioned above.  The second 
group would only be a problem if the issuing company had acquired a firm in the sense that the 
capital structure control variables in these observations will have different relationships with the 
dependant variable than the remainder of the sample.  Due to the omission of these groups of 
firms, there exists some survivorship bias in my sample. 
The 31,929 observations represent issues of equity, debt (either convertible or straight), 
or preferred equity (either convertible or straight) and the relevant financial environment around 
which the company makes its decision regarding type of security to issue.  Including the time 
series of these capital issuances brings my sample to over 106,000. 
I further collect data on firms not issuing capital during this period of time to represent 
those public companies that either cannot issue capital or have sufficient funds internally.  For 
less developed country firm-year observations, I collect the financials for 1996-2003 for the most 
exhaustive list of firms for each country as possible from REUTERS, collecting the exact same      15 
   
 
data utilized for the issuer dataset.  Developed country firm-year observations are collected from 
Worldscope, due to the inability of REUTERS to provide such large amounts of data given the 
fact that it is intended for practitioners researching only a few companies at a time.  I believe this 
does not cause a bias due to the careful matching of accounting information.  Including these 
non-issuer firm-year observations, the number of observations in my dataset totals approximately 
195,000 firm-year observations. 
Seven countries out of the original 53 were dropped due to insufficient data
20.  In these 
cases there were only one or two observations of capital issuance, not enough from which to 
obtain any statistically significant results.  Two more countries (Taiwan and Bermuda) fall out 
due to insufficient macroeconomic data, leaving the sample number of countries to be 44. The 
exclusion of these countries decreases the sample size by 3294 firm-year observations, which is 
less than two percent of the overall sample. 
Given the fact that there are over 24,000 firms in my sample, it is not surprising that the 
range of firm-level statistics such cash, leverage, uniqueness profitability and risk span a range 
that is considerable in size.  Not surprisingly, small firms seem to have much more leverage than 
their large peers (Cull et al 2004; Rajan and Zingales 1995).  Profitability and risk for the small 
firms are considerably large, reflecting the higher growth rate of the small firms.  The majority of 
the sample is not crosslisted.  Corruption index scores, created by Transparency International, 
range from 1.7 (most corrupt) for Indonesia to 10 (least corrupt) for Denmark.  Market 
capitalization ranges from 97 (Bolivia – U.S.$MM) to 16,600 (U.S. - $MM).  Annual net foreign 
portfolio investment scaled by gross domestic product ranges from –157M (Germany) to $378M 
(U.S.).  A full list of summary statistics for the dataset is provided in Table IA.   
                                                 
20 These countries are Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxembourg, Papau New Guinea, South Africa and 
Bangladesh.      16 
   
 
Descriptions, as well as sources, of both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables as 
well as definitions of financial data used in the analysis are provided in Appendix A.  Size, 
country development and geographic distributions for the entire sample, as well as correlations 
for the variables used in my analysis are provided in Tables IB - IF. 
A. Firm-specific  information 
Inasmuch as accounting practices differ widely across nations, some of the typical 
measurements used in domestic studies may not be used in international empirics lest the results 
acquired be meaningless.  Databases, such as REUTERS, obtain financials for these listed 
companies from the exchanges.  To the extent that these different exchanges in the different 
countries have different reporting requirements, financial definitions may vary.  Differences in 
currency value are avoided by using ratios, which will be comparable across countries.  This is 
executed through a scaling by total assets unless otherwise noted. 
As many empiricists have attributed size as a determinant of capital structure, I assign 
size categories based on Total Assets.  Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) find a positive relationship between leverage and size.  Titman and Wessels (1988) find 
that size influences not only the extent of leverage but also the type.  My proxy for this follows 
both Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) and is calculated as total 
assets
21. 
Profitability of firms would be an obvious influence on firms inasmuch as this impacts 
how well a firm can either pay interest and/or dividends.  Titman and Wessels (1988) provide 
two measurements for this variable that are fairly applicable universally.  They are operating 
                                                 
21 This is done annually so that firms may switch size groupings over years.  The analyses are also done using 
average size of the eight year periods.  As results are unchanged, they are omitted for brevity.      17 
   
 
income divided by sales and operating income divided by total assets.  I utilize both in my 
analysis but provide results for profitability based on sales only for the sake of brevity. 
Also relevant to capital structure determination is Asset tangibility.  This refers to how 
palpable the assets of a firm are and relates to capital structure concerns through its limitations 
on debt levels due to the ability to provide collateral.  A firm has less collateral the less tangible 
its assets are.  This, arguably, could be said to increase the probability of bankruptcy due to the 
inability to obtain funds when there are especially needed.  This follows logically from the fact 
that a company without material assets would not be able to liquidate to obtain the necessary 
funds to pay off debtors if it were necessary.  This variable is created by calculating fixed assets 
divide by book value of assets (following Rajan and Zingales 1995).  Once again, within-country 
industry averages are used in those cases where there is missing data.  For the same reasons 
given above justifying the rationale for industry average substitution as proxies for uniqueness of 
assets, industry averages are suitable proxies here. 
Similar to profitability, the Growth of a firm impacts how well a firm is able to pay 
interest and/or dividends and is a typical capital structure determinant.  Proven to be an 
influential variable in capital structure (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Titman and Wessels 1988; 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus 1993), I include a proxy as calculated by the percentage change in total 
assets for a one-year term.   
External Financing Necessary is included to address those observations where firms do 
not issue capital not because they cannot, but because they possess sufficient internal capital to 
fund desired projects.  To correct for any additional access a firm might have in other nations 
which might affect financial constraints (Lins et al. 1999) it is vital to include an indication of 
whether a firm has listings in other countries (i.e. ADR on a U.S. stock exchange).  Thus I      18 
   
 
Include a dummy variable for Crosslisting that takes on a value of 1 if a firm is listed on an 
exchange outside of its nation of domicile and 0 otherwise.   
B. Industry  information 
Differences in industry classification are avoided by using as industry indicator the SDC 
Platinum Macro industry code as my categorization.  An industry dummy is included to 
account for any industry fixed effects. 
C. Macroeconomic  information 
Based on results from such papers as Booth et al. (1999), Welch (2004), and 
Nejadmalayeri (2001) I include macroeconomic factors to capture their impact on capital 
structures in different countries.  All macroeconomic variables, unless otherwise stated are 
averaged over a lagged three year period to abstract from business cycle effects.  GDP growth is 
the percentage growth in gross domestic product per capita is included to control for the size and 
development of the country.    
Instruments for FPI volatility are included based on work done by Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (1998) with regard to indicators of currency crises.  FXChg controls for changes in 
the real foreign exchange rate, extreme levels in this serve as one of the definitions of, or a proxy 
for, currency crisis.  The liquidity of capital markets, proxied by Total Value Traded, is 
included to instrument FPI volatility.  This is due to the negative effect reduced market liquidity 
has on the confidence of foreign investors (Aggarwall et al 2003).   The variable Relative 
Interest Rates is included to control for potential demand for foreign investment in certain 
countries based on the return available for investment relative to other countries providing 
implications on both domestic economics and international business (Samak and Helmy 2000).   
Finite changes in the rating institutional investors, or IIRChange, give a country can have      19 
   
 
immense changes in the volatility of FPI and is thus included.  Controlling for the investment 
environment, I include Corruption, which is an indices reflecting the level of corruption in a 
country by the International Country Risk Guide.  Including proxies for the extent to which the 
level of corruption existing in a country follows the methodology of BDM (2002) and (2003), as 
well as many other examinations of access to finance in an international setting.   Papers such as 
Claessens and Laeven (2003), Smarzynska and Wei (2001), and La Porta et al. (1998) point out 
the importance of investment climate as a determinant of financial development.    
To control for the impact of other potential sources of funds for firms I include savings, 
domestic credit and foreign direct investment.  Savings is the calculated as the difference 
between gross domestic product and consumption.  Domestic Credit is a proxy for the amount of 
“bank debt” that is provided by both banks and other financial institutions to control for another 
important source of financing for small firms (Cull et al 2005).  Foreign Direct Inv., or foreign 
direct investment, is included to control for the effect provided by the more stable of the two 
global capital flows on capital issuance.  This is important given the fact that the impact of 
foreign direct investment is likewise beneficial for alleviating financing constraints (Harrison 
et al 2004). I further include the level FPI to distinguish between the effects of the volatility of 
the capital flow and its trend. 
The variable of interest in this study, foreign portfolio investment volatility, or FPIVol, is 
included in log difference terms and scaled by foreign portfolio investment levels for the 
countries in the sample.  These scaled values are use to illicit predicted values of scaled net 
foreign portfolio capital flows based on the work of Agarwal (1997). 
Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade are variables created to depict the 
environment within which investors find themselves.  This classification is created based on a      20 
   
 
rating of the creditworthiness of the country – the Institutional Investor Rating.  This rating is 
used by Reinhart et al. (2003) to infer the general impression of a country’s solvency with regard 
to foreign debt and has implications on how volatile short-term investment may be as a result of 
confidence (or the lack thereof) in a nation’s proximity to crisis.  The relevance of institutional 
investor’s impression of the solvency of country sovereign debt has also been mentioned in 
Samak and Helmy (2000) as an important factor in the “pull” of foreign portfolio investment to a 
country. 
Lastly, I include Propensity for Crisis in the robustness section of this chapter.    This is 
used as an alternative and perhaps more direct measure of a country’s proximity to crisis based 
on the works of Kaminsky (2003) and Kaminsky et al. (1998) which examines the timing and 
leading indicators of crises respectively. 
D. Data  Correlation 
Table IF provides a correlation matrix for all of the variables used in the analysis.  There 
are no notable significant relationships in the firm-specific data.  The only variables that exhibit 
any interrelation are some of the macro variables.   The correlation of several macroeconomic 
variables is significant, which is generally an issue in many international studies.  As a result, 
empirical examinations using different specifications including select macroeconomic variables 
and the subsequent addition of problematic variables are executed to provide robustness to the 
results given the potential empirical biases based on correlation between the macroeconomic 
independent variables.        21 
   
 
IV. Results 
A.  Small Firm Access to Capital 
The volatility of foreign portfolio investment could theoretically pose a threat to existing 
investors via security values and the firms via asset values if and when capital leaves the country 
very rapidly in times when investor confidence is quite low, for example, in crisis periods.  This 
volatility, however, does not have to translate into a decreased level of access to finance if the 
short-term effects such as a decrease in liquidity does not outweigh the longer-term benefits of 
foreign portfolio investment that make this enhanced level of financing access possible, such as 
strides to improve the investment environment.  In support of that logic, Table II displays an 
economically insignificant negative coefficient for small firms in all three samples – on average 
of 0.012 – that is a 0.012% decrease for a 1% increase in the level of volatility.  Even in a 
multiplicative sense given probable swings in the level of volatility, this is a very small number.  
Checking the coefficient on the control for the level  in FPI, it is further apparent that the 
volatility coefficient (marginal effect) is not large enough to completely reverse the benefits of 
FPI.  In fact, it hinders it minimally when defining volatility in this manner.  Firm access to 
capital in the noninvestment grade sample is not even statistically significant, suggesting that 
volatility in these country-years is absorbed and goes relatively unnoticed.    
Using a relative measure of volatility as defined as the level of volatility relative to global 
volatility provides similar results.  Only the magnitude of the marginal effects changes, 
increasing to an average of 0.065, implying that it is the relative, rather than the absolute, level of 
volatility that matters with regard to the level of impact.  Having said that, the noninvestment 
grade sample (specification 3) is insignificant – this was not the case when using a straight-
forward volatility definition.  This is perhaps due to the fact that when a country-year is deemed      22 
   
 
noninvestment grade, its volatility relative to other country-years is not as important as the fact 
that it is currently considered a bad investment.    
Looking to the change in volatility, it becomes obvious that changes in the variance of 
FPI net flows inhibit access to capital in general.  Both the economic and statistical significance 
of this negative association of FPI volatility perhaps speaks more to proximity to periods of 
crises and the confidence of not only foreign investors but also to domestic investors.  Increases 
in the level of variance suggest a much more volatile macroeconomic environment, one that 
would decrease the pool of “investible” firms by causing a flight to quality by investors to safe 
investments.  The marginal effect of the change in volatility on access to public finance is 
negative and significant across the board for this definition of volatility.  What’s more, the 
economic significance has increased to on average 0.127, implying a more significant effect once 
one considered the potential multiplicative effect of this coefficient given swings in FPI 
volatility. 
Alternate sources of capital demonstrate expected relationships with capital issuance 
(access to public finance).  Foreign direct investment has a positive influence on capital issuance 
as does national savings.  Domestic credit, a substitute for public capital issuance, is negative.  
Interestingly, for the investment grade sample, the marginal effect of GDP growth 
demonstrations that firms issue counter-cyclically, when they are more likely to need external 
financing.  Noninvestment grade, and to a certain extent, the whole sample, show a positive 
relationship with GDP growth and access to finance which could imply some type of capital 
rationing wherein firms only receive access to capital in better times.  Comprehensive results 
may be found in Table II.      23 
   
 
B.  FPI Volatility and Firm Growth 
Importantly, the results in Table III show that volatility may indeed be bad for small firm 
growth but it seems as if it doesn’t always have to be.  Perhaps surprisingly,  we see that growth 
in the base specification (“all” times) for growth in total assets is not significantly negatively 
associated with an increase in FPI volatility and growth in sales revenue actually reflects a 
positive significant association with the same.  This is good news for proponents of capital 
market integration since it implies that FPI instability does not have to hinder firm growth, which 
in turn implies that it may not derail the economic growth that Bekaert et al., (2003) suggest 
might ensue with this integration.   
Corresponding nicely with the results in Table II is the fact that growth in the investment 
grade sample, growth in sales revenue is positively impacted by FPI volatility.  Having said that, 
it is not statistically significant.  The noninvestment grade sample seems to be the only 
specification where FPI volatility exhibits a significantly negative association with growth.  This 
impact is not surprising given the results for these firms in Table II demonstrating a decreased 
probability of being able to access public financing in two of the three volatility definitions, 
coupled with the typically enhanced risk aversion of investors in these times.  The extent of this 
marginal effect relative to the benefits of FPI seems to be more significant than the effect on 
access to finance.  For growth in total assets in particular these marginal effects, although 
insignificant, demonstrate a potentially threatening force for these small firms.  Growth in sales 
revenue seems to offer a more pronounced effect, suggesting that this form of growth is more 
immediately reactive to cash flow, but reflects a much less threatening effect, offering some 
support to the contention that FPI benefits are not neutralized in the presence of its volatility.       24 
   
 
Overall, these results should help to allay fears that volatility hinders these firms, at least in the 
short run.   
 
V. Robustness 
A.  Alternate Definitions and Sample 
Performing sensitivity analysis around definitions of key variables such as FPI, as well as 
altering sample country inclusion definition provides some robustness for the results.  To use 
another definition for foreign portfolio investment, I scale the net flow by gross private capital 
flows into a nation instead of the previous scale – gross domestic product – and calculate the 
logarithm of the variance of the term t-1 through t-3 based on this definition.  This definition of 
FPI is utilized in Harrison et al. (2004).  I also define FPI scaling by market capitalization.  
Lastly, to alter sample country inclusion specifications, I drop countries that may bias results due 
to changes in capital control policy or specific laws which may bias results such as in China, 
where only B shares were offered on the market for foreign investors during this term and 
foreign banking was not possible before 2002.  These countries include China, Malaysia, Hong 
Kong, Korea and Chile
22.  Performing these three specifications leaves the vast majority of the 
results in place.  The magnitude of the marginal effects is slightly altered but overall, results 
remain similar and can be found in Table IV. 
 
B. Proximity  to  Crisis 
To address concerns that the volatility measure utilized does not capture fully the  
                                                 
22 South Korea was liberalized in 1998, which is two years after the first year of the examination period.  Chile 
initiated the encaje, which is legislation that may have had an impact on FPI levels and Hong Kong did not have FPI 
levels for a portion of the examination period.      25 
   
 
downside of FPI, I reexamine the data using a measure which captures a country’s proximity to 
crisis perhaps more directly.  Using the country-years depicted in Kaminsky (2003) as currency 
crisis years and Beck et al. (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for banking crisis 
years, I create a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if a country is in either a currency 
or a banking crisis and zero otherwise.  The inclusion of the banking crisis variable is due to the 
frequency of banking crises and currency crises to occur simultaneously – the so-called “twin 
crises”  (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Zhu 2003).   Using leading indicators of crises from 
Kaminsky et al. (1998), I regress the following: 
Prob (y=1)j,t = ω0 + ω1FXRatej,t-1 + ω2ΔIIR j,t-1 + ω3NetCapAcct j,t-1 +  
ω4Reserves j,t-1 + ΰ     (4) 
 
where FXRate is the real exchange rate, ΔIIR is change in the institutional investors’ Country 
Sovereign risk rating, NetCapAcct is the net capital account level, and Reserves is a country’s 
amount of reserves.  I perform this cross-sectional probit regression both in and out-of sample.   
 
B.1 In-sample 
Looking at the in-sample regression first, the following regression is run.   
Prob(y=1)j,t = ψ0 + ψ1FPIj,t-1 + ψ2CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1 + ψ3FPIj,t-1 +  
ψ4Xi,t-1 + ψ5Yj,t-1 + Ii + t + ε    ( 5 )  
where CrisisProp is the propensity for a country to go into crisis as defined as the instrumented 
value, or the first stage of a two-stage least squared regression.  All other variables are defined as 
previously in the paper.    
Results from this analysis provide insight as to how the benefits of foreign portfolio 
investment deteriorate with an increase in a country’s risk of crisis.  The interaction term in 
Table V shows that this impact is not surprisingly negative.  Taken collectively with the positive      26 
   
 
and significant effect of the FPI term implies that as the propensity for crisis grows large for 
country j, the benefit derived from FPI decreases.  In fact, this benefit is completely reversed 
when the propensity for crisis reaches only 24%.  This fits in nicely with the volatility analysis 
since we see that all countries can be hindered by the volatility in this capital flow but not in all 
times.  Although the enhanced access to finance gained from this foreign capital flow falls with 
an increase in the propensity for crisis, a positive benefit is retained for most of the sample.  
Indeed, the mean propensity for crisis in the sample is only 18.5%, indicating that this is not the 
case for the majority of the sample.   
The results do indicate, however, that for those countries particularly sensitive to crisis, 
enhancements in access to finance may not be maintained if stability in these economies is 
interrupted. In fact, the effect seen in the interactive variable coefficient relative to the crisis 
propensity variable alone shows us that FPI actually does exacerbate the effect of the crisis – as 
the popular press accuses.  Although this is not great news for advocates of market integration, it 
underscores the importance of a stable infrastructure and investment environment that will 
endure the challenges that currency and/or banking crisis offer an economy.  Recognizing that 
the definition of crisis in this examination includes banking crises and acknowledging once again 
that currency crises and banking crises may well occur contemporaneously, the banking sector, 
as well as financial markets, plays a large role in the stability maintenance of countries
23.    
Results regarding growth are similarly supportive of earlier findings.  Looking to growth 
in sales revenue, the definition of growth that many economists feel is more valuable to the 
economy, we see that although FPI is positive and significantly related to small firm growth, its 
effects diminishes when combined with a nation’s propensity for crisis.  The sample average of 
                                                 
23 The inclusion of this variable also may bias upward a country’s propensity for risis making the actual point at 
which FPI’s benefits are neutralizes higher than 24%. 
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18.5% just nullifies any positive influence FPI has on growth.  Indeed, this positive influence is 
more rapidly negated than the influence on capital issuance.  This is not particularly surprising 
given the risk aversion during crisis periods and the reactions firms have with regard to their 
operations.   
B.2 Out-of-sample 
Using estimates of propensity for crisis outside of the sample period instead of within, I 
examine the cross-section of the sample in each year, utilize the fitted value of equation (4) for 
the preceding four-year period (i.e. 1991-1995 for time=1996, 1992-1996 for time=1997, etc.).   
Doing so provides more detail in the results, which highlights the Asian Crisis and its contagion 
in the results.  Years other than 1998-99 offer very similar results to those in the in-sample 
analysis.  The two-year period of the crisis interrupts these relationships quite a bit.  The 
interactive term looses its significance, more than likely because a significant portion of the 
sample is either in crisis or influenced by crisis due to contagion.  Fitting in nicely with this is the 
fact that we see that the coefficient for FPI is actually negative here.  FPI provides value as long 
as a country’s propensity for crisis is not above the average for the sample – the significant 
difference between the variables of interest as well as the majority of the control variables 
demonstrates nicely how few macroeconomic factors aren’t affected negatively by crisis making 
the case that FPI is one factor among many that may lead to decreased access to capital when a 
country is in crisis.  These results may be seen in Table VI. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
Although foreign portfolio investment is a possible additional source of investment 
capital for small firms, the volatility of this capital flow in times of crisis unfortunately imposes a      28 
   
 
sobering effect on the benefits FPI provides with regard to enhanced access to finance.   
Importantly, the short-term growth of these firms seems to be relatively unaffected by the 
variability in this capital flow, except in those periods of decreased investor confidence 
(alternatively - in periods of higher country risk).  In these less “investible” periods, FPI 
volatility hinders the small firm when taking growth into consideration, implying that access to 
finance may be interrupted, and that the risk aversion that ensues with volatility in these capital 
flows decreases benefits derived from it in these times through decreased liquidity. 
Results in this paper support the contention that volatility of capital flows is potentially 
damaging to host economies.  Specifically, FPI volatility can interrupt enhanced access to 
finance for small firms.  The results do not support the contention that volatility is harmful in all 
times, finding that waves of investment do not significantly decrease the probability that a small 
firm is able to issue capital in the public markets in times when investor confidence is increased 
and does not necessarily hinder firm growth in the short term.  A policy implication of this is that 
countries should try to stabilize capital flows by way of increasing institutional investor 
confidence in their nation.  Fortunately, having open borders to foreign investors goes part of the 
way toward that end, since liberalized nations see increases in both the size and the liquidity of 
markets, as well as improvements in corporate governance and disclosure.        29 
   
 
Table IA Summary Statistics 
Cash is defined as cash and/or marketable securities scaled by total assets. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by total assets. Asset tangibility is defined as fixed asset 
divided by the book value of total assets. Profitability is defined as operating income divided by sales. Risk is defined as the standard deviation of the firm’s 
profitability ratio over the previous three years. Crosslisting is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if a firm is crosslisted. Growth in total assets/sales is 
defined as the annual growth rate in percent form. Corruption is an assigned value for a given country regarding its level of corruption (0 highest; 6 lowest). Domestic 
Credit (banks) refers to credit provided by all banks scaled by GDP. FDI is the amount of foreign direct investment. Property Rights is a measure from 1 (most 
effective) to 5 (least effective) measuring the efficacy of a country’s legal system. FPI/GDP is foreign portfolio investment is investment (in dollars) in the equity of 
foreign companies scaled by GDP. FPI Volatility is the variance of FPI net flows scaled by GDP from time t-3 through t-1. Fiscal Burden is a measure of the level of 
taxes usurped by the government from corporations from 1(fewer taxes) to 5 (higher taxes). GDP growth is the growth rate of gross domestic product. Institutional 
Inv. Rating is an index of a country’s credit worthiness. Inflation is defined as the increase in consumer price index (%). Liberalization is a dummy variable taking on 
a value of 1 if a country has undergone a liberalization in the current period and zero otherwise. Relative interest rates refer to the prevailing interest rates adjusted for 
inflation scaled by the world average. Share is the percent of the world market capitalization represented by a country’s market capitalization.  Total value traded is 
the value of shares traded. 
Panel A:  Small Firm Characteristics 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Asset Tangibility  41503  0.41 0.57 0.00  73.42 
Cash 31814  18.68  21.25  0  100 
Crosslisting 41723  0.14  0.35  0  1 
EFN  33015 0.23  4.57  -369.56  397.26 
Growth in Sales  26667  0.23  1.04  -10.91  15.77 
Growth in Total Assets  27019  0.27  0.97  -10.38  14.37 
Leverage 33727  1.48  137.43  0  25155 
Profitability 35125  -7.11  127.61  -7150.50  1548.37 
Risk 41501  0.59  9.90  -180.18  911.88 
Total Assets/GDP  35765  0.04  5.19  0  972.71 
Panel B:  Large Firm Characteristics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Asset  Tangibility  36927  37.48  59.95 0 72.98 
Cash 34089  15.24  19.48  0  155 
Crosslisting 41913  0.07  0.26  0  1 
EFN  32301 0.22 29.41  -18.87  5221.79 
Growth in Sales  23525  0.04  0.88  -12.88  12.43 
Growth in Total Assets  23767  0.04  0.80  -13.56  9.33 
Leverage 32780  1.10  41.32  0  6799 
Profitability 34197  -3.46  131.12  -11102.00  744.48 
Risk 40408  3.14  458.98  -3.73  91268.34 
Total  Assets/GDP  34848 0.4 16.23  0 2540.48 
Panel C:  Country-level Variables 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Corruption 352  3.831 1.325  1  6 
Domestic  Credit  352  78.712 47.630 11.357  202.510 
FPI 352  -0.004 0.102 -0.419 0.488 
FPI Volatility  352  4.60E+20  1.75E+21 0 1.62E+22 
Δ FX Rate  334  0.004  0.057  -0.010  1.033 
GDP Growth  352  0.033  0.024  -0.069  0.106 
Institutional Inv. Rating  350  65.117  21.445  18.650  95.900 
Property Rights  352  1.27  0.67  1  4 
Relative Interest Rates 352  1.005  1.279  -5.990  8.772 
Relative Volatility  352  0.090 0.009 0.051 0.106 
Share 352  8.908  16.789  0.002  100 
Total  Value  Traded  352  0.450 0.639 0.000 4.834 
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Panel D:   Crisis Variables 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
CrisisStar  (across  time)  347  0.185 0.165 0.001 0.999 
Propensity for Crisis (1995)  347  0.202  0.261  0  1 
Propensity for Crisis (1996)  347  0.218  0.225  0  1 
Propensity for Crisis (1997)  347  0.276  0.260  0  1 
Propensity for Crisis (1998)  347  0.128  0.197  0  1 
Propensity for Crisis (1999)  347  0.146  0.259  2.61E-06  1 
Propensity for Crisis (2000)  347  0.211  0.227  5.45E-09  1 
Propensity for Crisis (2001)  347  0.224  0.270  0  1 
Propensity for Crisis (2002)  347  0.050  0.086  0  0.996 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1991-1994)  347  0.250 0.129 0.060 0.664 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1992-1995)  347  0.245 0.128 0.040 0.672 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1993-1996)  347  0.250 0.129 0.024 0.639 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1994-1997)  347  0.254 0.126 0.005 0.626 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1995-1998)  347  0.236 0.120 0.003 0.592 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1996-1999)  347  0.225 0.126 0.000 0.583 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1997-2000)  347  0.238 0.130 0.001 0.579 
Avg  Propensity  for  Crisis  (1998-2001)  336  0.233 0.130 0.000 0.582 
Chg in Propensity (1995)  339  -0.092  0.063  -0.237  0.316 
Chg in Propensity (1996)  336  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.003 
Chg in Propensity (1997)  336  0.000  0.002  -0.002  0.008 
Chg in Propensity (1998)  336  -0.001  0.003  -0.002  0.008 
Chg in Propensity (1999)  336  -0.001  0.002  -0.002  0.008 
Chg in Propensity (2000)  336  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.002 
Chg in Propensity (2001)  336  -0.001  0.002  -0.002  0.008 
Chg in Propensity (2002)  336  -0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.000 
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Table 1B   Security Issuance by Country For Sample 
Country Debt  Conv.  Debt Equity  Preferred 
Conv. 
Preferred  Total 
Argentina  29 10 61  2  . 102 
Australia 21  58  8245  48  .  8372 
Austria 2  .  91 .  . 93 
Belgium .  .  173 .  . 173 
Bolivia 6  .   1 . 7 
Brazil  94 25 51 35  . 205 
Canada .  .  26  14 . 40 
Chile 37  .  160 .  . 197 
China 7  .  1291 .  . 1298 
Colombia 23  .  32 .  . 55 
Denmark .  1  192  .  .  193 
Finland 6  1  224  .  .  231 
France 48  11  1207  .  .  1266 
Germany  6  1 585 7  .  599 
Greece .  2  133  .  .  135 
Hong Kong  4  5  900  .  .  909 
Hungary .  .  16 .  .  16 
India 125  .  179 .  .  304 
Indonesia 40  .  128 .  .  168 
Ireland .  .  41 .  .  41 
Israel .  .  8 .  .  8 
Italy 3  .  203 1  .  207 
Japan 2149  239  1951  .  .  4339 
Malaysia  64  2 418 1  .  485 
Mexico  91 1 33 .  .  125 
Netherlands 10  1 136 6  .  153 
New Zealand  2  5  42  3  .  52 
Norway 1  1  102  .  .  104 
Pakistan .  .  22 .  .  22 
Peru 143  .  3 .  .  146 
Philippines 18 .  42 .  .  60 
Poland .  2 32 .  .  34 
Portugal .  .  46 1  .  47 
Singapore 59  .  314 .  .  373 
South  Korea .  . 397 9  . 406 
Spain 5  .  98 .  .  103 
Sri Lanka  .  .  11 .  .  11 
Sweden 22  .  236 .  .  258 
Switzerland 51  7 104 1  .  163 
Thailand  71 2 77 .  .  150 
Turkey .  .  11  .  .  11 
US  42  121  3438  3620 17 7238 
United Kingdom  7  .  1855 12  .  1874 
Venezuela 19  .  38 1  .  58 
Total  3205 495  23352  3762  17 31831 
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Table 1C  Investment Around the World 
FPI is net foreign portfolio investment scaled by GDP. FPI Volatility is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net 
flows scaled by GDP from time t-3 through t-1. MarketCapDollars is the market capitalization of country j in U.S. 
dollars. Property Rights is an index of the level of property rights in country j.  FXRate is country j’s local currency 
per $1. Values are averaged over the sample period 1996-2003. 







Argentina 1.538  0.449  9.61E+10  2.5  1.263 
Australia 2.708  0.446  3.41E+11  1  1.238 
Austria 1.076  0.456  3.24E+10  1  12.304 
Belgium -5.116  0.465  1.67E+11  1  36.052 
Bolivia -0.297  0.324  2.45E+08  3.125  5.849 
Brazil 2.059  0.460  2.11E+11  3  1.635 
Canada 0.250  0.453  6.61E+11  1  1.462 
Chile -0.250  0.414  6.41E+10  1  509.906 
China -0.191  0.439  3.33E+11  4  8.293 
Colombia 0.713  0.402  1.35E+10  3.25  1658.071 
Denmark -1.039  0.454  9.36E+10  1  6.998 
Finland -0.135  0.425  1.96E+11  1  5.311 
France -0.947  0.481  1.07E+12  2  5.899 
Germany 0.018  0.490  1.08E+12  1  1.770 
Great Britain  1.420  0.497  2.27E+12  1  0.641 
Greece 2.725  0.430 8.65E+10  2.25 261.711 
Hong Kong  -0.120  0.464  4.99E+11  1  7.763 
Hungary 3.258  0.422  1.11E+10  2  217.940 
India 0.591  0.416  1.39E+11  3  41.160 
Indonesia 0.236  0.415  4.42E+10  3.375  6679.344 
Ireland -8.426  0.442  4.56E+10  1  0.707 
Israel 1.777  0.417  5.17E+10  2  3.827 
Italy 1.221  0.477  5.52E+11  2  1761.769 
Japan -0.876  0.471  3.19E+12  1.25  115.400 
Malaysia -0.993  0.402  1.52E+11  2.375  3.370 
Mexico 1.375  0.460  1.22E+11  3  8.636 
Netherlands -2.477  0.456  5.53E+11  1  1.968 
New Zealand  -0.085  0.413  2.63E+10  1  1.417 
Norway -5.081  0.443  6.04E+10  1  7.623 
Pakistan 0.854  0.377  7.88E+09  3.375  47.615 
Peru 1.048  0.395  1.23E+10  3.125  3.049 
Phillipines 2.085  0.424  5.11E+10  2.375  38.559 
Poland 0.678  0.413  2.11E+10  2  3.545 
Portugal 0.413  0.428  4.92E+10  2  179.444 
Singapore -12.366  0.437  1.44E+11  1  1.624 
South Korea  0.0001  0.443  6.54E+10  1  1103.469 
Spain 0.082  0.472  3.85E+11  2  148.772 
Sri Lanka  0.058  0.334  1.56E+09  2.875  70.373 
Sweden -4.389  0.449  2.92E+11  1.625  8.364 
Switzerland -7.079  0.457  6.46E+11  1.125  1.470 
Thailand  1.108 0.416  5.58E+10  1.75 36.057 
Turkey -0.002  0.430  5.84E+10  2.25  617279.900 
USA 1.997  0.501  1.28E+13  1  1.000 
Venezuela -0.055  0.408  2.65E+10  3  239.550 
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Table ID  Country Development and Size Distribution 
Property Rights groups are assigned on a yearly basis and are based on market capitalization.  Size groups are assigned on both a yearly and 
within country basis and are based on total assets. 
 
Property  Rights  Freq. Percent Cum.   Size  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Developed 181,395  94.21  94.21    Small  43,072  33.26  33.26 
Less  Developed 11,146 5.79  100    Large  43,257 33.4  100 
 
Developed Property Rights    Less Developed Property Rights 
Size Freq.  Percent  Cum.    Size Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
Small  39,343  33.29 33.29    Small  2,870 32.71 32.71 
Medium 39,417  33.33 66.63    Medium 2,909 33.72 66.43 
Large  39,491  33.37 100    Large  2,908  33.57 100 
 
 
Table IE  Geographic Distribution 
Nation  Freq. Percent  Cum.   Nation  Freq. Percent  Cum. 
Argentina  381 0.20 0.20  Italy  1,031 0.55  35.05
Australia  14,907 7.97 8.17 Japan  29,724 15.9  50.95
Austria  418 0.22 8.39  Malaysia 3,217 1.72  52.69
Belgium  571 0.31 8.71  Mexico  691 0.37  53.06
Bolivia  22 0.01 8.74  Netherlands  785 0.42  53.48
Canada  91 0.05 8.79  New Zealand  856 0.46  53.94
Chili  1,542 0.82 9.61  Norway  1,353 0.72  54.66
China  6,345  3.39 13.00  Pakistan  979 0.52 55.18
Colombia  165  0.09 13.09  Peru  502 0.27 55.47
Denmark 554  0.30  13.40  Philippines 2,474 1.32  56.79
Ecuador 11  0.01  13.41  Poland 1,329 0.71  57.50
Finland 1,354  0.72  14.13 Portugal  630 0.34  57.84
France  7,634  4.08 18.21  Singapore  3,581 1.92 59.76
Germany  3,997  2.14 20.35  Spain  519 0.28 61.27
Great Britain  15,527  8.30  28.65  Sri Lanka  69 0.04  61.31
Greece  1,338  0.72 29.37  South  Korea  2,286 1.22 60.99
Hong  Kong  3,618  1.94 31.31  Sweden  2,748 1.47 62.78
Hungary  458  0.24 31.55  Switzerland  756 0.40 63.18
India 1,560  0.83  32.39  Thailand 3,748 2.00  66.84
Indonesia 2,946  1.58  33.97  Turkey 2,718 1.45  68.29
Ireland 727  0.39  34.36  United States  57,992 31.02  99.31
Israel  260  0.14 34.50  Venezuela  58 0.03 99.34
          
         
  
         3 4  
          
 
 Table 1F  Correlation 
Panel A:  Firm-Level Variable Correlation 
 Cash  Leverage  Asset  Tangibility Profitability Risk Crosslisting 
Growth in 
Total Assets 
Leverage  -0.366***  1       
Asset  Tangibility  -0.239***  0.114***  1      
Profitability -0.027***  0.015*** 0.010***  1       
Risk  0.251*** -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.042***  1     
EFN 0.015***  0.031***  -0.003  -0.001  0.030***  1   
Crosslisting  -0.005* 0.012***  0.040*** 0.005* 0.021*** -0.001   
Growth in Total Assets  0.084***  0.038***  0.000  -0.011***  -0.047***  0.017***  1.000 
Growth in Sales  0.116***  -0.006  -0.008**  -0.118***  0.005  0.019***  0.712*** 
Panel B:  Country-level Variable Correlation 
  FPI Vol  Rel Vol  Del Vol  FPI 
GDP 
Growth FDI  Δ FX Rate  TVT 
Rel Int. 
Rates Corruption  Savings  Dom  Credit
Investment 
Grade 
Rel  Vol  0.057  1.000             
Δ  Vol  0.102*  0.208***  1.000            
FPI  -0.013  -0.063  -0.024  1.000           
GDP  Growth  0.018  -0.197***  0.009  -0.190***  1.000          
FDI  0.040  0.060  0.060  -0.453***  0.051  1.000         
Δ  FX  Rate  0.024  -0.057  0.011  0.051  0.064  -0.030  1.000        
TVT  0.126**  0.281*** 0.066 -0.241*** 0.060  -0.032  -0.093*  1.000           
Rel Int. Rates  -0.042  -0.081  -0.056  0.190***  -0.128**  -0.049  0.106**  -0.205***  1.000         
Corruption  0.097*  0.304*** -0.007 -0.141*** -0.079  0.079  -0.025 0.145***  -0.207*** 1.000       
Savings  -0.009  0.060  -0.029 -0.422***  0.400***  0.184*** -0.019 0.145***  -0.281*** 0.065  1.000     
Dom  Credit  -0.017  0.427*** 0.004 -0.255*** 0.056  0.091* -0.137**  0.530*** -0.280  0.301  0.432  1.000   
Investment  Grade  -0.037  0.257*** -0.011 -0.154***  -0.232*** 0.152  -0.024 0.350***  -0.116**  0.112**  0.005 0.229*** 1.000 
NonInvestment 
  Grade  0.037  -0.257*** 0.011 0.154***  0.232***  -0.152*** 0.024 -0.350***  0.116**  -0.112** -0.005 -0.229*** -1.000 
 
  Δ IIR 
Investment 
Grade  NonInvestment Grade Reserves  Net Capital Acct
Investment~e 0.043  1.000       
NonInvestm~e  -0.043  -1.000  1.000   
ReservesDol -0.109**  0.206***  -0.206***  1.000   
NetCapAcct~l 0.137**  -0.066  0.066 -0.425***  1.000 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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Table II  Volatility and Access to Capital  
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = β0 + FPIVolj,t-1β1 + FPIj,t-1 β2 + Xi,t-1β3 + Yj,t-1β4 + + Ii + t + ε. Specification (1) is the whole sample while specifications (2) and (3) are 
Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade country-years respectively. Investment grade (non-invesetment grade) is those country-years greater than (less than) the annual median of the Institutional 
Investor Rating, which is a measure of a nation’s creditworthiness. FDI is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned to the private sector.  
Savings is a nation’s GDP minus consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross domestic product. FPI is net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI is the 
logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = γ0 + ΔFXRatej,t-2γ1 + Corrj,t-2γ2 
+ RelIRj,t-2γ3 + ΔTVTj,t-2γ4 + ΔIIRj,t-2γ5 + t + ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption.  RelIR is country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest 
rates (by year). TVT is total value of listed shares traded.  ΔIIR is the change in the institutional investor rating, which proxies for changes in investor confidence or proximity to crisis. Observations are 
firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  Volatility  Relative Volatility  Change in Volatility 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
FPI Volatility  -0.007**  -0.026  -0.004**  -0.108** -0.029  -0.058  -0.209***  -0.021***  -0.151*** 
  [0.003] [0.037] [0.002] [0.048] [0.032] [0.042] [0.023] [0.004] [0.038] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.912***  0.524  0.992**  0.884***  0.264  1.024***  1.867***  0.837*  1.426*** 
  [0.300] [0.799] [0.503] [0.072] [0.496] [0.221] [0.260] [0.452] [0.272] 
Domestic  Credit  -0.158*** -0.259*** -0.142*** -0.076*** -0.146*** -0.103*** -0.061*** -0.175***  -0.044 
  [0.011] [0.090] [0.020] [0.013] [0.016] [0.039] [0.019] [0.050] [0.028] 
Savings  0.346*** 0.874 0.271***  0.255**  0.159  0.245*  -0.189*** 0.294  -0.125 
  [0.098] [0.638] [0.092] [0.106] [0.310] [0.137] [0.034] [0.418] [0.110] 
GDP  Growth  1.147  -7.718*** 1.235***  0.222  -6.014*** 0.745*** 1.880*** -5.109*** 1.824*** 
  [0.774] [0.891] [0.286] [0.181] [0.856] [0.233] [0.282] [0.734] [0.575] 
FPI  0.502***  0.352*  0.498*** 0.447*** 0.289*** 0.442*** 0.342***  0.182  0.404*** 
  [0.142] [0.200] [0.063] [0.023] [0.062] [0.084] [0.018] [0.141] [0.055] 
Observations  52883 27738 25145 54072 28415 25657 54070 28415 25655 
R-squared (1
st  stage)  0.106 0.711 0.146 0.376 0.819 0.146 0.068 0.522 0.096 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Model χ
2  334***  501***  9805*** 15003*** 2672***  9805  14964*** 2679*** 10044*** 
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Table III Volatility and Firm Growth 
The following OLS model is specified: Growthit = δ0 + FPIVolj,t-1δ1 + FPIVolj,t-1δ2 + FPIj,t-1δ3  + Xi,t-1δ7 + Yj,t-1δ6 + Ii + t + ε. Size groups are 
formed based on terciles. Specification (1) is the whole sample while specifications (2) and (3) are Investment Grade and Noninvestment Grade 
country-years respectively. Investment grade (noninvesetment grade) is those country-years greater than (less than) the annual median of the 
Institutional Investor Rating, which is a measure of a nation’s creditworthiness. Growth is defined as the logarithm of the difference in total assets 
scaled by the difference in years. FDI is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned 
to the private sector.  Savings is a nation’s GDP minus consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross domestic product. FPI is 
net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 
and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = γ0 + ΔFXRatej,t-2γ1 + Corrj,t-2γ2 + RelIRj,t-2γ3 
+ ΔTVTj,t-2γ4 + ΔIIRj,t-2γ5 + t + ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption.  RelIR is 
country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates (by year). TVT is total value of listed shares traded.  ΔIIR is the change in the institutional 
investor rating, which proxies for changes in investor confidence or proximity to crisis. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control 
variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  Growth in Total Assets  Growth in Sales Revenue 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
FPI Volatility  -1.237 -1.012  -3.610***  2.366* 2.329  -1.13 
  [1.789] [1.562] [1.233] [1.435] [1.656] [1.240] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.965  0.914  1.792*  -0.168  -0.266  0.595 
  [0.915] [0.947] [1.043] [0.434] [0.472] [1.044] 
Domestic  Credit  -0.001 -0.008 0.076 -0.052 -0.036 0.089 
  [0.060] [0.070] [0.067] [0.041] [0.049] [0.075] 
Savings  0.368 0.372  -1.654***  0.276 0.252  -1.031* 
  [0.656] [0.692] [0.600] [0.223] [0.238] [0.571] 
GDP Growth  -0.573  -0.512  0.039  1.205**  1.121*  2.214 
  [0.886] [0.691] [1.947] [0.605] [0.667] [2.005] 
FPI 0.282  0.231  0.492**  -0.209*  -0.236*  0.144 
  [0.294] [0.312] [0.221] [0.113] [0.135] [0.177] 
Constant 0.217  0.084  1.761***  -1.340**  -1.383*  0.548 
  [0.777] [0.673] [0.670] [0.668] [0.745] [0.686] 
Observations  35749 19515 16234 35493 19491 16002 
R-squared (1
st  stage)  0.106 0.711 0.146 0106 0.711 0.146 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Model  R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.23 
  
    37                                     
  
Table IV  Alternate Definitions and Sample   
The following probit model is specified, adjusting for frequency of country observation: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = β0 + FPIVolj,t-1β1 + FPIj,t-1 β2 + Xi,t-
1β3 + Yj,t-1β4 + + Ii + t + ε.  Development is based on level of property rights and size groups are formed based on terciles. Specification (1) uses 
FPI as a proportion of gross private capital flows as an alternative FPI (and FPI volatility) definition.  Specification (2) uses FPI as a proportion of 
market capitalization as an alternative FPI (and FPI volatility) definition. Specification (3) drops Malaysia and China from the sample to avoid 
any bias due to capital controls. FDI is the level of foreign direct investment scaled by its GDP. Domestic Credit is the amount of credit loaned to 
the private sector.  Savings is a nation’s GDP minus consumption. GDP Growth is annual growth in a nation’s gross domestic product. FPI is net 
foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP. Volatility of FPI is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from time t-3 through t-1 
and represents the instrumented value obtained from the following first stage regression: FPIVolj,t-1 = γ0 + ΔFXRatej,t-2γ1 + Corrj,t-2γ2 + RelIRj,t-2γ3 
+ ΔTVTj,t-2γ4 + ΔIIRj,t-2γ5 + t + ε. ΔFXRate is the change in the real exchange rate. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption.  RelIR is 
country j’s interest rate scaled by world interest rates (by year). TVT is total value of listed shares traded.  ΔIIR is the change in the institutional 
investor rating, which proxies for changes in investor confidence or proximity to crisis. All country-level variables are three year trailing moving 
averages. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed 
variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
 
  Investment Grade  Noninvestment Grade 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
FPI Volatility  -0.000***  -0.048**  -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.006  -0.003*** 
 [0.000]  [0.022]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.016] [0.001] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.106  2.993***  0.636  0.997***  -1.611  1.317*** 
 [0.116]  [0.941]  [0.637]  [0.194] [1.823] [0.267] 
Domestic  Credit  -0.194*** -0.164*** -0.260*** -0.129*** -0.388*** -0.127*** 
 [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.030]  [0.007] [0.062] [0.021] 
Savings  0.521*** 0.732*** 0.767***  0.187*  2.287*** 0.607*** 
 [0.052]  [0.202]  [0.113]  [0.103] [0.840] [0.022] 
GDP  Growth  -6.369*** -0.186 -7.610*** 0.313 -3.583***  1.151*** 
 [0.631]  [0.772]  [0.265]  [0.512] [0.611] [0.256] 
FPI  0.261***  0.074  0.543*** 0.451*** 1.063*** 0.869*** 
 [0.051]  [0.145]  [0.029]  [0.023] [0.146] [0.076] 
Observations  28415 25694 28415 25693 26006 24194 
R-squared (1
st  stage)  0.773 0.095 0.576 0.209 0.842 0.162 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Model χ
2  2805*** 9914*** 2688*** 9957*** 2708***  10791*** 
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Table V  Access to Capital and the Propensity for Crisis  
In Sample Estimation 
The following probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)i,t = ψ0 + FPIj,t-1 ψ1 + CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1ψ2 +FPIj,t-1ψ3 + Xi,t-1ψ4 + Yj,t-1ψ5 + Ii + t + 
ε. Low (High) are based on whether the domicile country for the firm-year observation is lower (higher) than the median value for the sample that 
year. Propensity for Crisis is the fitted value of the following equation: Prob (y=1)j,t = ω0 + ω1FXRatej,t-1 + ω2ΔIIR j,t-1 + ω3Exports j,t-1 + 
ω4NetCapAcct j,t-1 + ω5Reserves j,t-1 + ΰ where FXRate is the foreign exchange rate, ΔIIR is the change in the institutional investor rations, Exports 
is the level of exports, NetCapAcct is a country’s net capital account, and reserves is a country’s level of foreign exchange reserves. FPI is 
average net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP, from time t-3 through t-1. GDP Growth is the growth in gross domestic product. 
Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the private sector scaled by GDP. Savings is gross domestic product minus investment, scaled 
by GDP. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption. Observations are firm-year specific. Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 
1 percent respectively. 
  Capital Issuance  Growth in Revenue 
 All  Low  High  All  Low  High 
Propensity for 
Crisis*FPI  -6.100*** 1.851*** -8.057*** -0.108**  0.052  -0.066 
  [1.572] [0.367] [0.729] [0.043] [0.042] [0.245] 
FPI  1.456*** 0.104*** 2.292***  0.017*  -0.015  0.000 
  [0.321] [0.015] [0.147] [0.009] [0.012] [0.004] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  1.254***  0.070***  3.082***  -0.001*  0.002**  0.045** 
  [0.378] [0.023] [0.368] [0.000] [0.001] [0.020] 
Propensity for Crisis  -0.023***  0.364*** -0.179***  0.025**  -0.017  -0.017* 
  [0.006] [0.021] [0.006] [0.010] [0.015] [0.009] 
GDP Growth  -1.895***  -0.708***  -0.637***  -0.025*  0.003  0.043*** 
  [0.411] [0.052] [0.179] [0.015] [0.010] [0.009] 
Domestic  Credit  -0.153*** 0.005 -0.051*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002** 
  [0.021] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Savings 0.891***  0.265***  0.070**  0.001  0.005***  0.021*** 
  [0.111] [0.051] [0.031] [0.003] [0.002] [0.008] 
Corruption 0.008**  0.003***  -0.004*  -0.000***  0.000  0.001*** 
  [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
N  50817 21486 22019 38379 16602 16073 
F-Test  (1st  Stage-Crisis)  0.238 0.354  0.3  0.238 0.300 0.355 
F-Test  (instr.-Crisis)  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
F-Test  (1st  Stage-FPI)  0.291 0.464 0.268 0.291 0.268 0.464 
F-Test  (instr.-FPI)  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Model χ
2  10754***  3859***  6540***  53*** 12*** 16*** 
  
    39                                     
  
Table VI  Access to Capital and the Propensity for Crisis  
Out of Sample Estimation 
The following cross-sectional probit model is specified: P(Capital Issuance)it = ψ0 + FPIj,t-1 ψ1 + CrisisPropj,t-1*FPIj,t-1ψ2 +FPIj,t-1ψ3 + Xi,t-1ψ4 + 
Yj,t-1ψ5 + Ii + t + ε. Propensity for Crisis is the fitted value of the following equation for the trailing four-year period: Prob (y=1)j,t = ω0 + 
ω1FXRatej,t-1 + ω2ΔIIR j,t-1 + ω3Exports j,t-1 + ω4NetCapAcct j,t-1 + ω5Reserves j,t-1 + ΰ where FXRate is the foreign exchange rate, ΔIIR is the 
change in the institutional investor rations, Exports is the level of exports, NetCapAcct is a country’s net capital account, and reserves is a 
country’s level of foreign exchange reserves. FPI is average net foreign portfolio investment flows scaled by GDP, from time t-3 through t-1. 
GDP Growth is the growth in gross domestic product. Domestic Credit is the level of credit provided to the private sector scaled by GDP. Savings 
is gross domestic product minus investment, scaled by GDP. Corr is an index denoted the level of corruption. Observations are firm-year specific. 
Firm-level control variables are left out for brevity. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Detailed variable definitions are listed in the appendix.  
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Propensity for Crisis*FPI  -11.556***  -1.342** -0.334*** -0.008 1.327  -0.265***  -1.228***
 [0.888]  [0.605]  [0.058]  [0.009] [0.948] [0.079] [0.023] 
FPI 0.253***  0.520*** 0.381*** -0.023** -0.006  0.073***  1.148***
 [0.014]  [0.109]  [0.070]  [0.010] [0.020] [0.012] [0.280] 
Propensity for Crisis  0.004  0.000  -0.021*** -0.002*** -0.008  0.000  0.118* 
 [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.004]  [0.001] [0.011] [0.002] [0.064] 
GDP Growth  -0.757***  -0.204*** -0.975*** 0.003*** -0.084  -0.088  0.622 
 [0.097]  [0.040]  [0.168]  [0.000] [0.103] [0.079] [0.804] 
Foreign Direct Inv.  0.230***  0.498*** 0.184*** -0.137** -0.451*  0.011  -0.983 
 [0.087]  [0.064]  [0.067]  [0.062] [0.231] [0.042] [1.297] 
Domestic Credit  -0.276***  -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.006** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.181***
 [0.026]  [0.003]  [0.009]  [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.015] 
Savings 0.188***  0.280*** 0.490*** 0.026**  0.350*** 0.185***  2.094***
 [0.034]  [0.028]  [0.083]  [0.012] [0.044] [0.003] [0.544] 
Corruption -0.015***  -0.001  0.005**  0.001**  0.014*** 0.008***  0.106***
 [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.009] 
N  5706  6294 7590 8138 8795 8268 4964 
F-Test  (1st  Stage)  0.765  0.857 0.810 0.419 0.630 0.484 0.761 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000***
F-Test  (1st  Stage)  0.743  0.765 0.694 0.697 0.775 0.699 0.582 
F-Test (instruments)  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000***
Model χ
2  1316***  2112*** 2162*** 2903*** 2715*** 1040***  540*** 
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Figure 1  Net Foreign Portfolio Investment Levels 



















Figure 2  Volatility of Net Foreign Portfolio Investment Levels 
Values are calculated as volatility of net foreign portfolio investment as measured by the variance of the previous three years scaled by net FPI 
flows for the same term.  Levels depicted in graph are in logarithm scale.  Developed Property Rights (DPR) is defined as those country-years 
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Figure 3 The Effect of FPI Volatility on Market Liquidity 
Graphs in the left column referred to countries with developed property rights and graphs in the right column refer to countries with less 
developed property rights.  The first row includes the entire examination period 1996-2003.  The second row examines only the country-years 
when a country’s Institutional Investor Rating increases from the previous year and the third row examines only the country-years when this 
rating decreases.  Liquidity is measured as market turnover.  FPI volatility is the logarithm of the variance of FPI net flows from the period t-1 
through t-3. 
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Figure 4  Database Coverage of Financials 
 
 Number  of 
Companies 
% of Companies 
with Financials 
Coverage 
Datastream  18414 34%  Listed  Securities 
Worldscope  15810 67%  Listed  Securities 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A:  Firm- and Industry-specific  
Variable Definitions 
Asset tangibility  Fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets; industry average is used in cases of missing 
data  FA/TA 
Cash  Cash or cash-equivalent divided by total assets Cash/TA 
Crosslisting  Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has stock listed on foreign exchanges and zero otherwise. 
Growth in assets  Log difference of growth in total assets  ((ln(TAt+1) –ln(TAt))/(Yeart+1-Yeart) 
Growth in sales  Log difference of growth in sales  ((ln(Revt+1) – ln(Revt))/(Yeart+1-Yeart) 
Leverage  The logarithm of total Liabilities divided by total assets 
ln(Total Liabilities/TA) 
Profitability  Operating income divided by sales OpInc/Sales (in Thous) 
Risk  The log of the variance of the firm’s profitability ratio over the three years prior to issue; industry 
average is used in cases of missing data  ln(var(ROAt, ROAt-1, ROAt-2)) 
Industry  Macro Industry Code from SDC Platinum 
 
Panel B:  Macroeconomic Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions  Source 
Corruption  An index from 0 (most) to 6 (least) of perceived corruption in a country based on 
the likelihood of solicited bribes from a country in relation to such factors of 
business as exchange controls, tax assessment, and loan protection.   
International Country 
Risk Guide 
FX Rate  The annual % change in the official exchange rate as determined by national 
authorities or to the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market 
(annual or averaged annually from monthly rates). 
WDI 
FPI  Foreign portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities' 
reserves covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars and are scaled by gross domestic product. 
WDI 
FPI Volatility  The logarithm of the variance of FPI/GDP from time t-3 through t-1.  WDI; own calculation 




Relative measure of confidence in a nation’s solvency based on a specific year’s 
Institutional Investor Rating relative the sample median rating for the term 1996-
2003. 
WDI; own calculation 
Net Capital 
Account 
Net capital account includes government debt forgiveness, investment grants in 
cash or in kind by a government entity, and taxes on capital transfers 
WDI 
Reserves  Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves 
of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the 





A rating from 0 (less) to 100 (credit) for each country based on their 
creditworthiness.  This rating is biannual and based on surveys of economists and 
sovereign risk analysts at global banks and securities firms. 
Institutional Investor; 
Reinhart et al., 2003 
Relative Int. 
Rates 
Interest rates adjusted for inflation scaled by the world average of the same.    WDI 
Total Value 
Traded 
The total value of shares traded during the period scaled by GDP.  WDI  
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